A Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis for Internet Access Market by Weiss, Martin et al.
- Shin, Correa, and Weiss -
University of Pittsburgh
ITS14 Conference Paper, Regulation and Public Policy
1
A Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis for Internet Access Market
Seung-Jae Shin Hector Correa Martin B.H. Weiss
Telecom. Program GSPIA Dept of Info. Sci. and Telecom.
sjshin@mail.sis.pitt.edu correa1@pitt.edu mbw@pitt.edu
+1-412-361-1051 +1-412-648-7653 +1-412-624-9430
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh PA 15260
Abstract
In this paper, we study the local dial-up Internet access market using a game theoretic model.  In
particular, we consider the Nash equilibrium of the service providers and examine their behavior
on investment and output level. We calibrate this model to fit the industry structure and data
found in rural markets. In the first part of the paper, we examine the Internet industry structure
and its characteristics. In the latter part of the paper, we create an abstract Cournot duopoly
model, in which real world cost and revenue projection will be used to find an Internet access
market equilibrium and its social welfare. These analyses allow us to explain the motivation for
the ISPs’ behavior, such as over-subscription and under-investment. Finally, we will present an
analytical framework for the Internet industry policy maker.
1. Introduction
It is well known that the cost characteristics of Internet capacity provisioning include large, up
front sunk costs and near zero short run marginal cost of traffic. Another well-known
characteristic of Internet industry is that the Internet dial-up access product is almost
homogeneous. These two features are significant determinants in the analysis of the Internet
industry.
ISPs in this industry are competitors and cooperators simultaneously: On one hand they are
competitors for their market shares but on the other they are cooperators that provide universal,
global connectivity, that is to say, one ISP’s decision has an influence to other ISP’s decision.
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Therefore, ISPs in the Internet industry have a strong dependence with each other. This unique
characteristics make the Internet suitable to game theoretic situation, i.e., each player in the game
model is a competitor in a market and there are interactions according to their strategic decision.
There are many ISPs in the access market, most of which are concentrated on urban metropolitan
area. Some of them are big companies and they are equipped with financial power and high level
of technology, but many of them are small-sized, family-operated, rural ISPs. From the universal
connectivity point of view, they are very important to give Internet accessibility to a whole
nation. Our model in this paper will focus on small ISPs in the rural area.
With the above assumptions, we can apply the Cournot duopoly model to ISPs in the rural
downstream market. The research purpose in this paper is to provide to the Internet industry
policy makers a framework that they have to take a consideration for small, rural ISPs when they
make a future Internet industry policy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the current Internet industry structure
focusing on ISPs and IBPs. Section 3 analyzes Internet access market using a Cournot duopoly
model and Section 4 refines this model using realistic data.  Finally, we conclude in the section
5.
2. The Internet Industry
2.1 Introduction
The Internet is a system that makes it possible to send and receive information, among all the
individual and institutional computers associated with it. Like telephone and radio, the Internet
eliminates the need for the communicating entities to be in the same place.  Like mail, it does not
require that the communicating entities coincide in time and it makes it possible to retain records
of what is being communicated. These “mail services” are provided by the Internet in a much
shorter time and a lower cost. Finally, the Internet also can be used to provide services similar to
those provided by the mass media.
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The Internet industry integrates the equipment, software, and organizational infrastructure
required for Internet communications. As a rough approximation it can be said it is divided into
two components: IBPs1 that transfer communications in bulk among network exchange points,
and ISPs2 that (1) receive communications from individuals or institutions and transfer them to
an IBP’s network, and (2) receive communications from IBP and transfer them to their
destination. Generally speaking, the Internet industry has a vertical structure: Upstream IBPs
provide an intermediate good and downstream ISPs using this input sell connectivity to the their
customers. Therefore, the relationship between IBPs and ISPs is that of wholesalers and retailers.
In reality the Internet is much more complex. The ISPs themselves are networks of users that
may directly exchange information among each other. In addition, the IBPs may provide services
directly to users3 and also may interconnect with other IBPs. In this sense, the Internet is a
network of networks that is accessible in many parts of the world. Since the telephone industry is
tightly intertwined with the Internet industry, we begin by with its examination.
2.2 Telephone Industry
Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) was designed and optimized for the transmission of
the human voice. In the U.S., telephone service is divided into two industries: (1) local telephone
service provided by Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) and (2) long distance telephone service
provided by Interexchange Carriers (IXCs). This structure creates a vertical hierarchy: Upstream
IXCs provide the connection between LECs, and the downstream LECs have direct access to
telephone users.
Traditionally, a LEC was a monopoly that served a specific geographic region without
competition. Even after deregulation, LECs are still considered by many to be a local monopoly,
especially for residential customers. In the U.S., the local telephone services provided under flat-
                                                 
1 IBPs are used to refer to NSPs (Network Service Providers or National Service Providers).
2 ISPs are used to refer to any company who can offer Internet connectivity. Some people use ISPs as a general term
including IBPs. Some people argue that ISPs can be differentiated from other types of online information services,
such as CompuServe or American On Line, because ISPs do not provide content but they focus only on providing
Internet connectivity.
3 IBPs like AT&T WorldNet, Broadwing, CAIS, Epoch, Netaxs, Savvis Communications, XO also support dial-up
access customers in the downstream market. (http://www.boardwatch.com/isp/bb/n_america.htm)
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rate billing, that is, a telephone user can originate local calls as many times and as long as he
wishes with only monthly flat rate. This type of billing system has been a great influence on the
growth of Internet access market.
The long distance market is now generally considered to be a very competitive market, though it
too was a monopoly at one time. Users can use a long distance calling with pre-selected IXC
through their LEC. Any IXC that wishes to handle calls originating in a local service area can
build a switching office, called a Point of Presence (POP), there. The function of the POP is to
interconnect networks so that now any site where networks interconnect is may be referred to as
a POP.
2.3 Internet Backbone Providers
With some simplification, it can be said that the IBPs receive communications in bulk from
POPs or NAPs (Network Access Points) and distribute them to other POPs or NAPs close to the
destination. NAPs are public interconnection points where major providers interconnect their
network and consist of a high-speed switch or network of switches to which a number of routers
can be connected for the purpose of traffic exchange. The function of NAPs is similar to major
airport hubs; all ISPs and IBPs are gathered at the NAPs to connect each other.
Before the Internet privatization, the NSF (National Science Foundation) was responsible for the
operation of the Internet. The NSF backbone ceased operation in late 1994 and was replaced by
the four NAPs4 (Minoli, 1998, pp27-28). There are probable around 50 major NAPs5 world-wide
in the Internet, most of which are located in the U.S. (Moulton, 2001, p551). As the Internet
continued to grow, the NAPs suffered from congestion because of the enormous traffic loads.
Because of the resulting poor performance, private direct interconnections between big IBPs
were introduced, called peering points.
                                                 
4 4 NAPs are Chicago NAP (Ameritech), San Francisco NAP (Pacific Bell), New York NAP (Sprint), and
Washington D.C. NAP (Metropolitan Fiber Systems).
5 Sometimes NAPs are known by names such as Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX), Federal Internet Exchange
(FIX), and Metropolitan Area Exchange (MAE).
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To make the Internet a seamless network, the IBPs have multiple POPs distributed over the
whole world. Most frequently they are located in large urban centers. These POPs are connected
each other with owned or leased optical carrier lines. Typically, these lines are 622 Mbps (OC-
12) or 2.488 Gbps (OC-48) circuits or more, as defined by the SONET6 hierarchy. These POPs
and optical carrier lines make up the IBP backbone network. The IBP’s POPs, are also connected
with the POPs of many ISPs. The relationship between an ISP’s POP and IBP’s POP is the same
as that of ISPs and IBPs.
There are two types of interconnections among the IBPs: peering and transit. The only difference
among theses types is in the financial rights and obligation that they generate to their customers.
The peering type of interconnection is used mainly by the big, equal-sized IBPs for reception and
distribution of the information that each one of them receives. From the interconnection
perspective, NAPs are the place for public peering. Anyone who is a member of NAP can
exchange traffic based on the equal cost sharing. Members pay for their own router to connect to
the NAP plus the connectivity fee charged by the NAP. On the other hand, the direct
interconnection between two equal sized IBPs is bilateral private peering, which takes place at
the mutually agreed place of interconnection. With transit agreements, usually small IBPs are
able to receive and send communications using the facilities of large IBPs, and must pay a fee for
these services. A concern related to transit is that while small IBPs do not have to pay in the case
of peering through NAPs, they must pay a transit fee if they directly connect to one of the large
IBPs. Before the commercialization of the Internet, carriers interconnected without a settlement
fee, regardless of their size. However, after the Internet’s commercialization, the large IBPs
announced their requirements for a peering arrangement, and any carrier who could not meet
those terms would be required to pay a transit fee in addition to the interconnection costs.
According to Erickson (2001), the North American backbone market had around 36 IBPs7 in the
first quarter of 2001. However, these numbers misinterpret the Internet backbone market
structure because this market is highly concentrated.  There were 11,888 transit interconnections
between backbone and access markets in April 2000. (McCarthy, 2000)  Counting by the number
                                                 
6 SONET stands for Synchronous Optical Networking. The capacity of OC-x is based on that of OC-1 (51.84 Mbps).
For example, the capacity of OC-3 is 3 times of OC-1. (155.52 Mbps = 3*51.84 Mbps)
7 These numbers are based on North America Region.
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of connections to downstream market, MCI/Worldcom is a dominant player in the backbone
market with 3,145 connections and Sprint is the second largest backbone provider with 1,690
connections and AT&T (934 connections) and C&W (851 connections) are the third and the
fourth.
Several of the large IBPs are subsidiaries of large telephone companies such as AT&T,
MCI/WorldCom, Sprint, etc. Since these companies own the infrastructure needed for telephone
services, they are very favorably positioned to provide the facilities and equipment required by
the IBPs. In addition, due to their size, they are able to offer large volume discount rates or
bundling agreements of both telephone and Internet lines for the services they provide. This is
possible because the Internet industry is lightly, if at all, regulated. In particular, there are no
regulations with respect to the tariffs that can be charged for the services provided. From these
observations it follows that the large IBPs, supported by the large telephone companies, are in a
position to capture large shares of the upstream market.
According to the Carlton and Perloff (1999, p247), the most common measure of concentration
in an industry is the share of sales by the four largest firms, called the ‘C4’ ratio. Generally
speaking, if the C4 ratio is over 60, the market is considered a tight oligopoly. For the upstream
backbone market this ratio8 is 73, which shows high concentration in the market. The entry
barrier is also high because there is a large sunk cost for nationwide backbone lines and
switching equipment. The number of IBPs for the past three years shows just how high the entry
barrier in the backbone market is: 43 (1999), 41(2000), and 36 (2001)9. The slight reduction for
last three years is caused by mergers and acquisitions10 and reclassification11.  According to the
number of players, we conclude that the overall backbone market is stable. In addition there are
significant economies of scale and the rapid pace of technological change generates a large
amount of uncertainty about the future return on investments. It is not easy to enter this market
without large investments and high technology.
                                                 
8 Source: TeleGeography, Inc. The calculation is based on the data of 1999 U.S. backbone revenue (Worldcom 38%,
Genuity 15%, AT&T 11%, Sprint 9%)
9 The Boardwatch magazine’s annual survey for ISPs.
10 AT&T and Time Warner, GTE and Bell Atlantic, Concentric and NextLink, Qwest and US West, etc
11 The backbone section was divided into backbone provider and data center provider from 2001 survey.
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The interconnection price is usually determined by the provider’s relative strength and level of
investment in a particular area (Halabi, 2000, 42p). It is certain T-1 transit price has been
decreased continuously. In 1996, the Internet connectivity for T-1 was $3,000 per month with
$1000 setup fee (Halabi, 1997, 40p). According to Martin (2001), the average price of T-1
connection in 1999 was $1,729. In 2000, it was $1,348. In 2001, it is $1,228. One of reasons for
decreasing T-1 interconnection price is advent of substitute services for T-1 line, such as wireless
Internet access technology12, digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, and cable-modem
technology, which exert a downward pressure on T-1 prices.
2.4 Internet Service Providers
An ISP’s product is public access to the Internet, which includes login authorization, e-mail
services, some storage space, and possibly personal web pages. There are several Internet access
technologies including dial-up, cable-modem, DSL, and wireless. According to U.S.GAO
(United States General Accounting Office) report (2001), the dominant technology is dial-up
access (87.5%) in 200013; so we restrict our analysis to that technology.
The following diagram illustrates the components of dial-up access ISP and its environment. The
DS-0 line (Digital Signal level 0)14 is a normal telephone local loop. The T-115 line between CO
and ISP’s modem pool is dedicated line for the ISP’s customer traffic from a particular CO to
their modem pool. Another T-1 line is needed to connect to the Internet, which runs from the
ISP’s router to the IBP’s POP.
[Figure-1: ISP Business Environment]
                                                 
12 LMDS (Local Multiple Distribution System) and satellite based Internet service
13 Dial-up (87.5%), Cable modem (8.9%), DSL telephone (3.2%), and Wireless (0.4%)
14 DS-0 is the basic digital signal converted from analog voice (64 Kbps).
15 T-1 line has 1.544 Mbps capacity, which is the same as 24 DS-0 (64Kbps) telephone lines.
ISP POP
Router
Internet
T-1
Server
T-1
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DS-0 DS-0
Modem Pool
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The ISP’s coverage area is usually determined by the existence of an ISP’s POP within the local
telephone area. ISPs are classified as local, regional, and national according to the scope of their
service coverage. The distribution of ISPs is presented in the Table-1.
Among 307 telephone area codes in U.S., the largest ISP covers 282 area codes and the smallest
covers only 1 area code. The ISPs with 1 to 10 area codes constitute 79.81% of the total number
of ISPs. This explains that most of ISPs in the downstream market are small, local companies.
Some of these small ISPs are subsidiaries or affiliates of CLECs (Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers), which are small telephone companies established in the 1990s as a result of telephone
industry deregulation.
[Table-1: Distribution of ISPs by their coverage]
Telephone area codes covered by ISP Percentage Type
1 35.14% Local
2-10 44.67% Local / Regional
11-24 4.11% Regional
25-282 16.08% National
• Source: The 13th edition of the Directory of Internet Service Providers, Boardwatch magazine
(www.ispworld.com/isp/introduction.htm)16
AOL-Time Warner is a dominant player in the dial-up access market. According to Fusco
(2001), AOL-Time Warner had 22.7 million subscribers in the 1st Quarter of 2001. The Table-2
shows top 10 dial-up ISPs ranked by the number of paying users.
[Table-2: Top 10 U.S. Fee-based ISPs (Dial-up only)]17
Rank & ISP Paying
User
Market
Share
Rank & ISP Paying
User
Market
Share
(1) AOL 22.7M 46% (6)Gateway.net 1.7M 3%
(2) MSN 5.0M 10% (7)AT&T WorldNet 1.3M 3%
(3)EarthLink 4.8M 10% (8)NetZero+Juno Online 1.0M 2%
                                                 
16 Total number of registered ISPs to this survey is 7,288 at March, 2001
17 Total number of customers of paid dial-up ISPs is 49.6 M at the first quarter of 2001 according to the
Telecommunications Report International Inc. We calculated market share of each companies and the rest of ISPs’
market share except top 10 ISPs is expected as 11%.
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(4) Prodigy 3.1M 6% (9) Verizon 0.9M 2%
(5)CompuServe 3.0M 6% (10) Bell South 0.8M 2%
• Source: www.isp-planet.com/research/rankings/usa.html
In the downstream access market the C4 ratio18 is 72, which is also highly concentrated.
However, the entry barrier in the downstream market is much lower than in the backbone
market. Since subscribers can utilize the PSTN line to connect ISPs’ modems and ISPs purchase
business telephone lines from a LEC, ISPs do not have to invest in access lines to individual
subscribers. They can build POPs to link to the PSTN and other ISPs. Since a T-1 lines prices
and telecom equipment prices are currently dropping quickly, a large number of small ISPs are
possible, especially in the less densely populated areas. The number of North American ISPs for
the past several years is an evidence of low entry barrier in the downstream market: 1447
(February 1996), 3640 (February 1997), 4470 (February 1998), 5078 (March 1999), 7463 (April
2000), and 7288 (March 2001)19.
In summary, considering market concentration and entry barriers, IBPs have more market power
than ISPs in the Internet industry. The Table-3 compares the IBP and ISP markets presented
above.
 [Table-3: Comparison of Access and Backbone Markets]
No. of companies Dominant Company C4 Entry Barrier
Backbone
Market
36 MCI/WorldCom
(UUNET20)
73 Higher
Access Market 7,228 AOL TimeWarner 72 Lower
• Sources: TeleGeography, Inc., Internet.com Magazine, and Boardwatch Magazine
Most ISPs provide unlimited Internet access with a monthly flat rate. For major national ISPs,
the price ranges generally from $0 to $25 per month21. Some ISPs provide Internet access service
                                                 
18 Source: www.isp-planet.com/research/rankings/usa.html
19 Source: www.ispworld.com/isp/images/NA_ISPs_chart.gif. At the time of July 2001, the number of ISPs is over
8,000.
20 UUNET is a subsidiary of MCI/WorldCom
21 Telecommunications International Inc.’s Quarterly Online Census at March 31, 2000
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with zero monthly subscription fees to their customers22; their revenues depend completely on
Internet advertising income. According to Zigmont (2000), the cost of startup ISP is roughly $12
per subscriber including $7 for management/maintenance cost plus $5 for marketing. For this
paper, we assume the price of dial-up Internet access to be $20 per month.
ISPs are free to make local peering arrangements with other ISPs. Cremer and Tirole (2000,
p445) call this local secondary peering. The Pittsburgh Internet Exchange (PITX) is an example
of local peering arrangement. Without this local peering, all network traffic passing from one
Pittsburgh network to another has to be sent through Washington, D.C., Chicago, or New York
City23. The sending and receiving networks pay an unnecessary cost for this inefficient handling
of data that should remain local. Participants in this local exchange point reduce their costs and
improve performance and reliability for their local Internet traffic with the equal basis of cost
recovery. However, this kind of peering is confined to only local traffic. Outbound traffic to
other areas still has to depend on the IBP’s transit service.
2.5 Relationship among Telephone Industry and Internet Industry
Dial-up access using PSTN is the most universal form of Internet access. In the U.S., such a
modem call is typically a local call without a per-minute charge. ISP’s lines are treated as a
business telephone user not as a carrier, so they are not required to pay the measured Common
Carrier Line Charge (CCLC24). The switching system in LEC’s CO connects calls between
Internet users and ISP’s modem pool so the LECs’ facilities support dial-up Internet
communications. In addition, IBPs and large ISPs often construct their backbone networks by
leasing lines from IXCs and LECs. As a result, we can say that telephone industry provide basic
infrastructure for the Internet industry.
The following diagram explains the overall Internet connections from end user to LEC’s CO,
ISP, IBP, and NAP. In this diagram, the local ISP’s POP connected to AT&T POP is located in
                                                 
22 AltaVista, FreeInternet.com, NetZero, FreeLane, Source: www.ispworld.com/introduction.htm,
23 Source: http://www.pitx.net/about.html
24 LECs have traditionally been charging IXCs $.03/minute at each end for originating and terminating calls. This
CCLC recovers part of the cost of the local loop not already recovered by the Subscriber Line Charge (SLC).
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the LEC’s CO. The AT&T and Sprint POPs are connected two ways: (1) through the public NAP
and (2) through a private peering line.
[Figure-2: Relationship among CO, POPs, and NAP]
            Modem
Central Office
Telephone-Switch
Local ISP
POP
Router
AT&T
POP
Public
NAP
Sprint
POP
Router
Router
Router
Peering
3. Duopoly Game Model in the Internet Access Market
3.1 Rationale for the Cournot Duopoly Model
The presentation below emphasizes the study of the downstream market, especially in a local
rural area. We chose the Cournot model because the product is homogeneous. Each ISP produces
a homogeneous Internet access service and the sum of their products equals the market output
(Q): Q = qi + qj where ISPi produces qi and ISPj produces qj.
The duopoly game model is a useful first approximation for the analysis of an industry with
limited competition. According to Greenstein (1999), 2069 counties (66%) out of 3139 in the
U.S. had two or less ISPs in the fall of 1998; 87% of these 2069 counties are rural. While
national ISPs usually concentrate in major urban areas and moderate density suburban and rural
areas, low-density rural areas are usually served by local providers. In these low density areas,
the national ISPs do not have local POPs so their customers would be forced to use measured
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service via a toll free number25. Thus, users of national ISPs have to pay a usage-based data
communication fee in addition to the ISP’s subscription fee. An important competitive advantage
of local ISPs is the lower cost of access for the local population. (Greenstein, 1999)  Thus, the
duopoly model in the local Internet access market is reasonable in this context and can provide a
foundation for the analysis of more complex markets.
3.2 Model Components and Basic Assumptions
In this model it is assumed that there are 2 duopolists (denoted ISP1 and ISP2) in the downstream
market without the possibility of new entrants. Their objective is to maximize their profits, which
are equal to its gross revenue minus its costs.
The following diagram illustrates components of the model and their connections. In this
diagram, each ISP has two T-1 connections: one with CO and the other with the IBP.
[Figure-3: Components and Connections of the Model]
According to McCarthy (2000), 71% ISPs offer 56 Kbps dial-up service. We assume that ISP1
and ISP2 sell only 56 Kbps dial-up Internet access to their customers and the quality of their
product is homogenous so that the users are indifferent to which ISP they use. We characterize
the revenue and cost functions of each ISP below.
                                                 
25 For example, AOL’s usage price for 1-800 number (28.8Kbps) is 10 cents / minute.
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3.3 The Revenue Functions of the Duopolists
The revenue function of each ISP is assumed to have two components: (1) the revenue obtained
from the subscribers and (2) those received from the advertisers that present their announcements
in the ISP’s web pages. In our analysis these two revenues will be calculated on a monthly basis.
We adopt the standard assumptions in the study of duopolistic competition with respect to the
revenue generated from the subscribers: each subscriber pays a price (ps) for the subscription,
and that this price decreases with the number of subscribers. Following the  Cournot model, the
selling price of subscription of the two ISPs is the same and is determined by the market demand
(Q), which is the sum of ISPi’s demand (qi) and ISPj’s demand (qj). Aassuming linearity, the
demand function can be expressed as:
Q = b0 –b1* ps         (1)
where Q = qi+qj, qi = number of subscribers to ISPi, i = 1,2,
 ps = price a subscriber pays, and b0,b1 = parameters.
Usually, the demand for Internet access service is considered to be insensitive to price. The
reasons for price-insensitivity are:
(1) The communications demand consists of access and usage demand. Demand for access is
considered less sensitive than demand for usage. Under flat rate pricing, the user’s price
includes both the usage and access price. But precisely speaking, because the quantity
that users can consume is unbounded, there is no usage demand and the usage price is
zero. (Wenders, 1987, p46).  Therefore, Internet access service itself is insensitive to the
price.
(2) The network externality effect. A potential user has a tendency to subscribe to the same
ISP as her friends and family for better and reliable communications between them. Even
if the monthly price is higher than she is willing to pay, she prefers to choose the ISP
with as many acquaintances as possible.
(3) Customer lock-in effect. If someone wants to change his current ISP, he has to tolerate
the inconvenience of notifying his correspondents of his new e-mail addresses. That is the
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same as the local number portability26 issue in the telephone industry, though services
such as hotmail, yahoo and others minimize this effect by offering addresses that are not
associated with ISPs.
If we make an inverse function of equation (1), the price for each subscriber to either of the two
duopolists can be expressed as:
 ps = a0 – a1*(qi+qj)      (2)
where a0, a1 = are scaling parameters and a0 = b0/b1, a1= 1/b1 .
As a result, the subscription revenue of ISPi is a product of ps and qi, i.e., ps*qi for i= 1,2.
The advertisement revenue is similar to that of newspaper and broadcasting industries. In reality,
the number of hits on a specific advertisement in web pages determines payment for that
advertisement, but in our model we simply assume that the monthly advertisement revenue per
subscriber (pa) is constant. This means that it can be simply characterized with the expression
pa*qi for i= 1,2, and where pa is the average monthly money per subscriber that advertisers pay to
ISPi.
The sum of the subscription and advertisement revenues is the total revenues of each of
duopolists, which can be expressed as:
total_revenuei= subscription_revenuei + advertsement_revenuei
               =  ps*qi + pa*qi
               = [a0 – a1*(qi+qj)]*qi + pa*qi
for i = 1,2; j = 1,2; i / j
3.4 The Cost Functions of the Duopolists
The cost structure of the Internet industry is characterized by large, up front sunk costs and near
zero short run marginal traffic cost. It is well known that with congestion-free network  the cost
to carry or process an additional minute of Internet traffic approaches zero, because the
                                                 
26 With the advent of local competition, telephone subscribers do not have to change their telephone number when
they move from one local telephone company to another (2001,Moulton, p101)
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incremental cost is near zero. (Frieden, 1998) In our model, the measuring unit of cost is not
traffic but a subscriber, i.e. the cost is calculated by the number of subscribers. Two basic
assumptions of the cost structure in our model are (1) large, up front sunk cost and (2) low
constant marginal cost for additional subscriber. Under these assumptions, the duopolists must
cover the following three types of costs to be able to provide their services: capital (cc), transit
(ct) and operation costs (co). Capital and transit costs are evaluated in similar ways, and are
characterized simultaneously. Operating costs are treated differently and will be discussed
below.
The capital costs are consist predominantly of  the equipment that an ISP needs to provide its
services, that is, mail-server, access layer router27, and modem pool. The transit costs are
payments by an ISP to an IBP for the right to use the IBP’s facilities to transmit the
communications of the ISP’s subscribers. Although the price of bandwidth is decreasing
substantially and the demand for T-328 lines and optical links are increasing, T-1 service still
dominates in the market29. We assume that the IBP sells only T-1 connections to two ISPs, which
is reasonable given that these are small ISPs serving a rural area.
It is assumed here that these two types of costs increase in equal steps. This means that an ISP to
provide services to 0 to n–1 subscriber(s) must purchase equipment worth $cc and must pay $ct
to an IBP for transit capabilities. For n to 2*n-1 subscribers the cost increases to 2*(cc+ct), and so
on. When the number of subscribers of duopolist i ranges between k*n and (k+1)*(n-1), the costs
of the duopolists are (k+1)*(cc+ ct).
The operating costs are assumed to be proportional to the number of subscribers. The operating
cost includes the set-up cost for network connectivity such as login account, allocation of
storage, user registration, etc. and maintenance costs for a single user of the network. These
                                                 
27 There is three-layers router hierarchy: access layer, distribution layer, and core layer. Access layer routers have a
function of access server connecting remote users to internetworks. Distribution layer routers are used to separate
slow-speed local traffic from the high-speed backbone. Core layer is the backbone layer.
28 The bandwidth of T-3 line is 45.736 Mbps, which equals to that of 28 T-1 lines.
29 At year 2000, T-1:1.2 million, T-3:58,000, Ocx:14,000, Source: Gartner/Dataquest
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types of costs increase as the number of users increase. This means that they can be represented
with co*qi, for i= 1,2.
3.5 The Profit Functions of the Duopolists
The equations presented above make it possible to express in the following way the profit
functions for the duopolists:
fi[qi, qj]=[a0 – a1*(qi+qj)]*qi + pa*qi – (k+1)*(cc+ct) - co*qi                        (3)
     for i = 1,2; j = 1,2; i / j and k*n < qi < (k+1)*n,
where n is the number of subscribers to be accommodated by a set of equipment and one  T-1
line.
3.6 Equilibrium Analysis
We can now rewrite each ISP’s profit functions (from equation (3)):
f1[q1, q2]=[a0 – a1*(q1+q2)]*q1 + pa*q1 – (k+1)*(cc+ct) - co*q1          (4)
f2[q1, q2]=[a0 – a1*(q1+q2)]*q2 + pa*q2 – (k+1)*(cc+ct) - co*q2          (5)
Assuming that each duopolist determines qi in maximizing profits, the first order conditions for
optimization forms a system of two equations with two unknowns. The solution of this system
gives the Nash equilibrium30 quantities that the duopolists should produce. The following table
shows the Nash equilibrium point and its corresponding profit. The equilibrium point and its
profit of each ISP are the same as those of the other ISP because the payoff functions for the two
duopolists are symmetric.
[Table-4: Equilibrium Point and its profit]
Equilibrium Quantity Equilibrium Profit
ISPi qi*= (a0-co+pa )/ 3a1 f1* [qi, qj]= (1/9a1){(a0
2-9a1(cc+ct)(1+k) –
2a0(co-pa) + (co-pa)
2}
3.7 Sensitivity Analysis
                                                 
30 A set of strategies is called a Nash equilibrium if, holding the strategies of all other firms constant, no firm can
obtain a higher payoff (profit) by choosing a different strategy ( 1999, Carlton and Perloff, p157).
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The Table 5 shows the derivatives of equilibrium quantity and profit for each parameter. The
equilibrium quantity of each ISP increases according to the following rules: (1) the larger the
number of potential users in a coverage area of each ISP (∂qi*/∂a0 >0), (2) the larger the
advertisement revenue per subscriber (∂qi*/∂pa >0), and (3) the smaller the operation cost per
subscriber (∂qi*/∂co <0). The parameters such as cc , and ct  do not give any influence to the
equilibrium quantity, but  as they increase, the equilibrium profit decreases (∂fi*/∂cc < 0, ∂fi*/∂ct
< 0).
[Table-5: Derivatives of Equilibrium Quantity and Profit]
Parameters Derivatives of Equilibrium Quantity Derivatives of Equilibrium Profit
a0 1/3a1 {2a0-2(co-pa)}/9a1
a1 (-a0+co-pa)/3a1
2 -(cc+ct)(1+k)/a1 – (1/9a1
2){a0
2-9a1(cc+ct)(1+k)-
2a0(co-pa)+(co-pa)
2}
cc N/A -(1+k)
co -1/3a1 (1/9a1){-2a0+2(co-pa)}
ct N/A -(1+k)
pa 1/3a1 (1/9a1){2a0-2(co-pa)}
4. Numerical Example
4.1 Parameters’ Values
We apply numbers to the above model based on the demographics of the markets that we are
studying. The following table presents the values of the parameters of the model.
[Table-6: Values of parameters]
Revenue Functions Cost Functions
Parameter Value Parameter Value
a0 50 cc $9,000
a1 0.01 ct $1,000
pa $8 co $1
ps 50 – 0.01*(q1+q2) n 1,000
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The detailed explanation will be offered below.
4.2 Values of Revenue Parameters
According to Greenstein (1999), in 1996 the ISPs in rural counties with under 50,000 population
were overwhelmingly local or regional, and in the Fall of 1998 the equivalent figure was 30,000.
Extrapolating from this trend, we assume that the population in our model market is 25,000.  On
average, 20% of the population subscribe to dialup service -- the estimated number of dial-up
users  was 60 million31 in 2001, compared with the population of the U.S. population  of 280
million. Applying this percentage to our model market, we compute the number of potential user
to be 5,000, which is the value of a0.
The assumed price range of dial-up Internet access in the model is $0 to $50 per month. Some
ISPs provide free Internet access service in exchange for viewing advertisements, so $0 per
month is the lower bound. We further assume that the upper price limit is the monthly price
($50) of DSL Internet access service, which is superior to dialup. If the price of dial-up access is
over $50 per month, a rational user would choose DSL service instead of dial-up service.
Therefore, in our model, there are two specific points: $0 with 5,000 subscribers and $50 without
users, which we use to determine the demand function.
Based on the above assumptions, we can write a market demand function like “Q =5,000 –
100P.” This demand function expresses that $1 increasing for local Internet access causes 100
users off from the Internet. Therefore, the value of a1 is 100 with this demand function. This
value is rather price sensitive, which conflicts a general idea of insensitivity of Internet access
service. However, there are two supporting ideas for our assumption that the demand function
that is rather sensitive to price:
(1) According to MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995), there are two types of users. One has a
very high value for the service, but only wants to use a little of it, i.e. ASCII e-mail. The
other user has a low willingness-to-pay for the service but wants to consume a very large
                                                 
31 Including free users (10 millions) and paid users (49.6 millions) at the first quarter of 2001, Source:
Telecommunications Report International Inc.
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amount of it, i.e, teenager’s downloading MTV videos. The demand function for high
value users is insensitive to the price but the demand function for low value users is
sensitive to the price because they are marginal users. After the advent of broadband
Internet access service, the high value users for dial-up Internet access have been moving
to the broadband market. Therefore, as times go by, the ratio of low value users in the
dial-up Internet access market is increasing, which means the demand function is
becoming more sensitive to the price.
(2) The U. S. GAO (2001, pp26-27) reports that the largest percentage of users (35%)
indicates that price is the basis for their choice of dial-up ISP. But among the broadband
users, the most common reason is that they selected their ISP because it was the company
that provided the features and applications of most interest to them (23%), which means
price is not a top priority to choose their broadband ISP.
For the value of pa, in our model we simply assume $8 per subscriber. According to the AOL’s
annual report year 2000, the advertisement revenue was $2,000 million. If we assume that the
number of AOL’s subscribers at year 2000 is 20 million32, the average monthly advertisement
revenue was approximately $8 per subscriber. Therefore, each ISP earns $8*qi per month as an
advertisement revenue. From this point of view, the number of subscribers is an important factor
for the advertisement revenue of ISPs. This type of revenue can justify increase of capacity with
a lower price of Internet access service to acquire more subscribers. In an extreme case,
subscription price per month may be reduced to zero and have only the advertisement revenue
source of income for an ISP.
The following graph shows the revenues of ISP1 when the ISP2’s quantity is assumed to be fixed
at q2 = 1,000. The straight line displays the revenue from advertisement (pa*q1), and the lower
curve displays the revenue from subscription (ps*q1) and the upper curve displays the total
revenue (pa*q1+ ps*q1). The negative subscription revenue over 4,000 subscribers occurs
because the price of subscription is negative because the total number of subscribers of both ISPs
becomes greater than 5,000 at this point.
                                                 
32 This number is estimated from the fact that the number of subscriber at first quarter of 2001 is 22.7 millions.
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[Graph-1: ISP-1’s revenues when q2=1000]
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4.3 Values of Cost Parameters
We assume that the value n is 1,000 subscribers. The calculation of 1,000 subscribers per one set
of equipment and one T-1 line is made under the following assumptions:
(1) The capacity between CO and ISP modem pool is determined by a concentration ratio of
1:10 (the number of modems to the number of subscribers). That means 100 modems are
enough to accommodate 1,000 subscribers.
(2) The capacity between the ISP and the IBP is determined by several factors. We already
assume T-1 line and 56 Kbps modems as a basic connection, and we add 1:6 bandwidth
ratio to this assumptions. The bandwidth ratio occurs because a user  does not consume
56 Kbps for the duration of the connection. Therefore 162 (= 27*6) users33 can access the
Internet simultaneously at one time. Peak load time is used to calculate the Internet traffic
capacity; the standard duration of peaks in the industry is assumed to be 4 hours a day. If
we assume the average holding time per user is 30 minutes, the number of users34 using
the Internet during 4 peak hours is 1,296 users (=27*6*8). From a network engineering
point of view, ISPs try to plan to have at least 20% excess capacity at their peak times,
and therefore 1,000 subscribers per T-1 line is reasonable number.
                                                 
33 27 =1.544Mbps / 56 Kbps  and 6 = 1:6 Bandwidth Ratio
34 8 = 240 minutes / 30 minutes
                   Total Revenue
      Subscription
      Revenue
      Advertisement
      Revenue
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(3) It is assumed that the value of the equipment (cc) is $9,000
35, which comes from the retail
price of an access router, a server, and 100 modems in 2001. The value of transit cost (ct)
is assumed to be $1,00036. The operation cost (co) per subscriber is assumed to be $1. In
summary, the ISP will spend $10,000 of capital and transit costs for the first 1,000
subscribers before it start its business and it will spend $1 for every subscriber. When the
number of subscribers reaches 1,000, the ISP will spend another $10,000. Therefore,
$10,000 can be viewed as a lump sum cost which is independent of q1 and q2.
The following graphs show total cost (=operation+capital+transit) and average cost (=total cost /
number of subscribers). The marginal cost curve consists of two parts: At the points of 0, 1000,
2000, 3000, 4000 the marginal cost is vertical and the other point is marginal cost is horizontal
with a value of $1.
[Graph-2: Total Cost and Average Cost]
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4.4 Profit Functions with real numbers
The following mathematical forms are the numerical payoff functions of the ISP1. The same
format is applied to those of ISP2 with the change of q1 and q2.
 q1*(ps + 8) – (1*q1 + 1*10,000) if 0 =< q1 < 1,000
 q1*(ps + 8) – (1*q1 + 2*10,000) if 1,000 =< q1 < 2,000
  f1[q1,q2] =  q1*(ps + 8) – (1*q1 + 3*10,000) if 2,000 =< q1 < 3,000
 q1*(ps + 8) – (1*q1 + 4*10,000) if 3,000 =< q1 < 4,000
 q1*(ps + 8) – (1*q1 + 5*10,000) if 4,000 =< q1 < 5,000
                                                 
35 A low-end access router  ($3,000) + a low-end mail server with software  ($3,000) + 100 Modems ($3000)
36 The average price of T-1 transit service is $1,288 per month (www.ispworld.com/isp). The big IBP’s price of T-1
is close to $2,000 per month and small provider’s T-1 price is less than $1,000 per month
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where ps = 5,000-Q  and  Q = q1+q2.
The following two 3D graphs show the profits of ISP1and ISP2 with the change of q1 (0 < q1 <
2,500) and q2 (0 < q2 < 2,500).
[Graph-3: Profits of ISP1 and ISP2]
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If we see the profit graphs in detail, we can find that the graphs are not smooth at the points of
1,000 and 2,000, which are the points for additional investment needed.
4.5 Equilibrium Analysis
We assumed that each ISP maximizes profits for any number of subscribers that the other ISP is
able to serve. This means that the maximum of the functions in f1[q1,q2] and f2[q1,q2] have to be
obtained with respect to q1 and q2. Since the functions are not continuous at the quantities 0,
1000, 2000, etc., the maximization has to be obtained within each cost interval. This is done
using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximization with inequality constraints. These
conditions are applied in two stages. In the first stage, the standard first order conditions of
elementary calculus are used. In the second stage it is analyzed if the inequality constraints are
satisfied, and if this is not the case, corrections are introduced.
Using the first order conditions for the maximization of each ISP’s profit functions with the
assumption that the number of subscribers of the other ISP is fixed, one obtains a system of two
equations and two unknowns. The maximization values of q1 and q2 are obtained solving this
system of equations.
q1 q1
q2 q2
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If we solve the above two equations (f1[q1,q2] & f2[q1,q2]) simultaneously, the equilibrium
quantity and its profit are:
q1* = q2* = 1,900 subscribers and
f1* = f2* = $16,100
with reaction functions of  q1= -50*(-57+ q2/100) and q2= -50*(-57+ q1/100). The following
graph shows two reaction functions: (1) R1[q2] = 2850 – 0.5*q2, and (2) R
2[q1] = 2850 – 0.5*q1.
These two reaction functions satisfy the stability condition in the Cournot model, which is
∂qi/∂qj < 1. In our reaction functions this value is ∂q1/∂q2 = 0.5. Therefore, the Nash
equilibrium quantity exists in our model. The intersection point of two reaction functions is the
equilibrium point, (q1*, q2*) = (1900, 1900). However, that equilibrium point is only meaningful
in the second cost intervals of each ISPs (1000 < q1, q2 < 2000), because a 1,900 is one of the
points of second cost interval and continuity is guaranteed only within this interval.
[Graph-4: Reaction Functions]
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For other cost intervals, we used computational method based on the definition of Nash
equilibrium, i.e., (1) fix q1 value from n0 to n999  (n0 <q1< n999) and find the best response value of
q2 at each fixed q1, and (2) do the same thing for q2, i.e. fix q2 value from m0 to m999  (m0 <q2<
m999) and find the best response value of q1 at each fixed q2. (3) If n is equal to m, i.e., two ISPs
stay in the same cost interval, the response values of two ISPs are always same because the profit
functions are symmetric. For example, in the first cost interval (0<q1, q2< 999), we find,
whatever the value of q1 and q2 in this cost interval, the best response values of q2 and q1 are
q1 = R
1(q2)
q2 = R
2(q1)
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always 999. Therefore, the equilibrium point in this cost interval is (q11*, q
1
2*) = (999, 999). The
superscript in this equilibrium point expresses the order of cost interval. (4) In the case of n / m,
i.e., there are multiple response values. In this case, the way to find an equilibrium point is to
compare the best response values of q1 from (1) and the best response values of q2 from (2), and
then find the intersection point. The detailed data for finding equilibrium points are given in the
appendix.
By this method, we obtain the following equilibrium table (Table 7)
[Table-7: Equilibrium points at each cost interval]
ISP1         
ISP2 < 1,000 < 2,000 < 3,000 < 4,000 < 5,000
< 1,000 999, 999 999, 1999 999, 2350 999, 3000 850, 4000
< 2,000 1999, 999 1900, 1900 1850, 2000 1350, 3000 1000, 4000
< 3,000 2350, 999 2000, 1850 2000, 2000 2000, 3000 2000, 4000
< 4,000 3000, 999 3000, 1350 3000, 2000 3000, 3000 3000, 4000
< 5,000 4000, 850 4000, 1000 4000, 2000 4000, 3000 4000, 4000
Whenever each ISP faces the number of subscribers over its capacity such as 1000, 2000, 3000,
or 4000 subscribers, it has to decide whether to make an investment for new subscribers or not. If
we assume that capacities of ISP1 and ISP2 are below 1,000 subscribers, optimal q1 and q2 are
999 subscribers whatever the other ISP’s is, because profit is continuously increasing within this
interval as the number of subscribers increases. Therefore, (q11*, q
1
2*) = (999, 999) is the local
equilibrium point within an interval of 0 < q1, q2 < 1,000. We can assume that if the ISP1
increases its capacity up to 1,999 subscribers, q21* is always 1,999 whatever the value of q2 is,
because profit of ISP1 is still increasing in this interval (1,000 < q1 < 2,000, 0 < q2  <1,000).  This
time, local equilibrium point moves to (q21*, q
1
2*) = (1999, 999). However, from this point the
ISP1 does not want to increase its capacity any more because the profit turns into down abruptly
at the quantity of 2,000 subscribers. The following graph illustrates this phenomenon.
[Graph-5: f1[q1, 999] when q2 = 999 and 1000 < q1 < 3000]
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At the current equilibrium point (q21*, q
1
2*) = (1999,999), the profit of ISP1 (f1[q1,q2]) is $34,013
and the profit of ISP2 (f2[q1,q2])is $16,993. However, at this time, the ISP2 does not want to
increase its capacity because the profit of ISP2 (f2[1999,q2]) in the new cost interval  (1000 < q2 <
2000) is lower then the current profit (f2[1999, 999]= $16,993). The following graph illustrates
this situation. The horizontal line in this graph represents $16,993. This is the case for first
mover’s advantage. Once one of ISPs increase its capacity, it is better off than the other when the
profit is increasing.
[Graph-6: f2[1999,q2] when q1=1,999, and 1000 < q2 < 3000]
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However, if ISP1 and ISP2 increase their capacity simultaneously, then the new equilibrium point
is (q21*, q
2
2*) = (1900, 1900). From the third to the fifth cost interval (2,000 < q1, q2 < 5,000),
each ISP does not want to increase their capacity because of decreasing profits. Once the two
ISPs choose the equilibrium point in the second cost interval, i.e. (1900, 1900), even though first
interval’s equilibrium point (999, 999) gives more profit to each ISP, they can’t go back to that
point, because the capital cost in the Internet industry is irrecoverable sunk cost.
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The following payoff matrix table is made by the level of investment, i.e. $10,000 for capital and
transit costs for up to 999 subscribers and $20,000 cost for 1,000 to 1,999 subscribers. Each cell
represents ISP1’s and ISP2’s profits of equilibrium point at the first and second cost intervals. If
we try to find the Nash equilibrium among the four cells, there are two equilibriums in the
matrix: (ISP1, ISP2) = ($10,000, $20,000) and (ISP1, ISP2) = ($20,000, $10,000). If ISP1 chooses
$10,000, ISP2’s best response is $20,000 because (f2[999,999] = $26,983) < (f2[999,1999] =
$34,013). If ISP1 chooses $20,000, ISP2’s best response is $10,000 because (f2[1999,999] =
$16,993) > (f2[1900,1900] = $16,100). The same logic can be applied to ISP2. If ISP2 chooses
$10,000, ISP1’s best response is $20,000 because (f1[999,999] = $26,983) < (f1[1999,999] =
$34,013). If ISP2 chooses $20,000, ISP1’s best response is $10,000 because (f1[999,1999] =
$16,9893) > (f1[1900,1900] = $16,100).
[Table-8: Payoff Matrix of Selected Cost Interval]
                                  ISP2
ISP1
$10,000 for 0 ~ 999
subscribers
$20,000 for 1,000 ~ 1,999
subscribers
$10,000 for
0 ~ 999 subscribers
f1[999,999] = $26,983
f2[999,999] = $26,983
f1[999,1999] = $16,993
f2[999,1999] = $34,013
$20,000 for 1,000~1,999
subscribers
f1[1999,999] = $34,013
f2[1999,999] = $16,993
f1[1900,1900] = $16,100
f2[1900,1900] = $16,100
If two ISPs decide their new investment simultaneously without knowledge of the other’s payoff,
we can easily assume that equilibrium points of each interval are on the locus of q1=q2 because
the profit functions are symmetric. The table 9 shows local equilibrium points at each interval.
Among them the maximum profit point is (q1*, q2*) = (999, 999). The graph 7 shows ISP’s
profit curve when q1=q2.
[Table-9: Equilibrium Point and its profit at each interval]
Interval Min Max q1* q2* f1* F2*
1 0 999 999 999 26,983 26,983
2 1000 1999 1900 1900 16,100 16,100
3 2000 2999 2000 2000 4,000 4,000
4 3000 3999 3000 3000 -49,000 -49,000
5 4000 4999 4000 4000 -142,000 -142,000
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[Graph-7: Profit curve when q1= q2]
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4.6 Collusion between ISP1 and ISP2
Because ISP1 and ISP2 are in the same market area and their profit structure is symmetric, it
would be possible for them to collude, earn monopoly profits and then divide it equally. The
monopoly profit function can be expressed by
F[Q]={Q*(5,000-Q)/100 + 8*Q} -  {(k+1)*10,000 +Q}              (6)
for k*1,000 < Q < (k+1)*1,000, k= 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
Q = market quantity,
F = monopoly profit.
The graph 8 shows the above profit function curve.
[Graph-8: Monopoly Profit Curve]
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The following table 10 shows the maximum monopolist’s profit at each interval. In summary, the
optimal point of collusion case is where the Internet access market produces 1,999 quantities
with a profit of $53,983, which means that each ISP produces 999.5 quantities equally with a
profit of $26,991.5 that is the same as equilibrium point in the first cost interval37.
[Table-10: Max profit in case of collusion like a monopolist]
Interval Min Max K+1 (cc+ct)*(k+1) Q* Q*/2 F* F*/2
1 0 999 1 10000 999 499.5 36,963 18,481.5
2 1000 1999 2 20000 1999 999.5 53,983 26,991.5
3 2000 2999 3 30000 2850 1425.0 51,225 25,612.5
4 3000 3999 4 40000 3000 1500.0 41,000 20,500.0
5 4000 4999 5 50000 4000 2000.0 18,000 9,000.0
• F*: Monopoly profit
• Q*: Monopoly Quantity
4.7 Welfare Analysis
According to Carlton and Perloff (1999, p71-72), one common measure of welfare from a market
is the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS). This measure of welfare is the
value that consumers and producers would be willing to pay and to produce the equilibrium
quantity of output at the equilibrium price. CS is defined as the amount above price paid that a
consumer would willing spend to consume the units purchased. In our model, CS can be written
by “0.5*(50 – P)*Q”, where P = (5000-Q)/100 is the market price and Q is the market quantity,
which is equivalent to the shaded triangle in the following graph.
                                                 
37 Only the integer value is useful for the sales of Internet connectivity, i.e. 999.5=999.
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[Graph-9: Consumer Surplus]
PS is defined as revenues minus variable costs, or equivalently, profits plus the fixed costs.
(Varian, 1999, p382) The variable cost is dependent on the level of output while the fixed cost is
independent on the level of output. In our model, within each cost interval, transit and capital
costs are not dependent on the number of subscribers. Therefore, in the short-run we can assume
transit and capital costs are fixed and operation cost is variable. A cell of the following table
shows sum of profits of two ISPs (f1+f2), fixed costs of ISP1 and ISP2 (FC1, FC2) and the
producer’s surplus (=f1+f2+FC1+FC2). If we assume that each ISP will make an investment for
new capacity only if it is expected to have a positive profit, the 11 shaded cells in the following
table are feasible areas for both ISPs.
[Table-11: Producer Surplus of Each Cost Interval]
      ISP2
ISP1 < 1,000 < 2,000 < 3,000 < 4,000 < 5,000
< 1,000
f1+f2=53,966
FC1=10,000
FC2=10,000
PS=73,966
f1+f2=51,006
FC1=10,000
FC2=20,000
PS=81,006
f1+f2=38,735
FC1=10,00
FC2=30,000
PS=78,735
f1+f2=18,023
FC1=10,000
FC2=40,000
PS=68,023
f1+f2= -18,775
FC1=10,000
FC2=50,000
PS=41,225
< 2,000
f1+f2=51,006
FC1=20,000
FC2=10,000
PS=81,006
f1+f2=32,200
FC1=20,000
FC2=20,000
PS=72,200
f1+f2=21,225
FC1=20,000
FC2=30,000
PS=71,225
f1+f2=-1,275
FC1=20,000
FC2=40,000
PS=58,725
f1+f2= -35,000
FC1=20,000
FC2=50,000
PS=35,000
< 3,000
f1+f2=38,735
FC1=30,000
FC2=10,000
PS=78,735
f1+f2=21,225
FC1=30,000
FC2=20,000
PS=71,225
f1+f2=8,000
FC1=30,000
FC2=30,000
PS=68,000
f1+f2=-35,000
FC1=30,000
FC2=40,000
PS=35,000
f1+f2=-98,000
FC1=30,000
FC2=50,000
PS=-18,000
< 4,000
f1+f2=18,023
FC1=40,000
f1+f2=-1,275
FC1=40,000
f1+f2=-35,000
FC1=40,000
f1+f2= -98,000
FC1=40,000
f1+f2=-181,000
FC1=40,000
$50
P*
5000Q*
CS
- Shin, Correa, and Weiss -
University of Pittsburgh
ITS14 Conference Paper, Regulation and Public Policy
30
FC2=10,000
PS=68,023
FC2=20,000
PS=58,725
FC2=30,000
PS=35,000
FC2=40,000
PS=-18,000
FC2=50,000
PS=-91,000
< 5,000 f1+f2=-18,775
FC1=50,000
FC2=10,000
PS=41,225
f1+f2=-35,000
FC1=50,000
FC2=20,000
PS=35,000
f1+f2=-98,000
FC1=50,000
FC2=30,000
PS=-18,000
f1+f2=-181,000
FC1=50,000
FC2=40,000
PS=-91,000
f1+f2=-284,000
FC1=50,000
FC2=50,000
PS=-184,000
The social welfares (SW) of the 11 shaded cells are calculated by summation of CS and PS.  The
following table is sorted by the social welfare value (last column).
[Table-12: CS, PS, and SW]
q1* q2* Q P f1+f2
Consumer
Surplus
Producer
Surplus
Social
Welfare
   2,000  2,000   4,000   10.00     8,000   80,000  68,000   148,000
   3,000     999   3,999   10.01   18,023   79,960  68,023   147,983
      999  3,000   3,999   10.01   18,023   79,960  68,023   147,983
   2,000  1,850   3,850   11.50   21,225   74,113  71,225   145,338
   1,850  2,000   3,850   11.50   21,225   74,113  71,225   145,338
   1,900  1,900   3,800   12.00   32,200   72,200  72,200   144,400
   2,350     999   3,349   16.51   38,735   56,079  78,735   134,814
      999  2,350   3,349   16.51   38,735   56,079  78,735   134,814
   1,999     999   2,998   20.02   51,006   44,940  81,006   125,946
      999  1,999   2,998   20.02   51,006   44,940  81,006   125,946
      999     999   1,998   30.02   53,966   19,960  73,966     93,926
• f1+f2 = Sum of both ISPs’ profits
• Q = q1*+q2* and P = (5000 – Q)/100
The following graph is built by the above table: X-axis is the market quantity (column 3) and Y-
axis is the sum of profits, CS, PS, and SW (column 5,6,7, and 8). As the number of subscribers in
the market increase, the CS and SW increase and sum of profits decreases. PS also decreases
except for the last row. Those imply that rural small ISPs are reluctant to make a new investment
after both reach the initial equilibrium, but large output level is good for consumers and society.
Stimulating new investment in the rural area is the point that the Internet industry policy maker
has to consider.
[Graph-10: Profits, CS, PS, & SW]
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5. Conclusion
The Internet has become an important social and business tool. The market has been quite
dynamic since it was privatized.  By studying rural markets where the market structure is
simpler, we are able to construct reasonable economic models that provide results that might be
generalizeable to the larger markets in some cases.
In this paper, we show that the unique cost and revenue structure of the Internet access market
has a significant influence on the equilibrium results. The optimal production quantities of ISPs
are maximized within the first cost interval, which might be a tendency to under-invest in
capacity if each ISP was fully aware of future consequences. In reality, the average number
paying dial-up users per ISP without the top 10 dial-up ISPs is roughly 80038. That means they
may not have large enough subscriber base to accumulate money to invest for potential future
users. In our analysis, the maximum profit of each ISP in its optimal equilibrium point is the
same as the half of monopoly profit. Therefore, there is no incentive for additional investment to
expand their business causing “over-subscription”, which seems to be common in the Internet
access market.
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[Appendix: Finding Nash Equilibrium in each Cost Interval]
(1) Nash equilibrium at the same cost intervals, for example 0<q1, q2< 999. The followings are
the response values (q2*) of ISP2 when q1 changes from 0 to 999. Whatever the value of q1 is,
q2* is always 999.
     q1    q2*     f2(q1, q2*)         f1(q1, q2*)
     ==      ==     ========         ========
     00      999         36962.99           -10000.00
     01      999         36953.00            -9953.00
     02      999         36943.01            -9906.02
     03      999         36933.02            -9859.06
     04      999         36923.03            -9812.12
     …     …          …                  …
    995      999        27022.94            26874.70
    996      999        27012.95            26901.80
    997      999        27002.96            26928.88
    998      999        26992.97            26955.94
    999      999        26982.98            26982.98
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The followings are the response values (q1*) of ISP1 when q2 changes from 0 to 999. Whatever
the value of q2, q1* is always 999. As a result, the equilibrium point in this interval is (q
1
1*, q
1
2*)
= (999, 999).
     q2    q1*     f1(q1*, q2)         f2(q1*, q2)
    ==       ==         ========         ========
     00      999        36962.99           -10000.00
     01      999        36953.00            -9953.00
     02      999        36943.01            -9906.02
     03      999        36933.02            -9859.06
     04      999        36923.03            -9812.12
     …     …         …    …
    995      999        27022.94            26874.70
    996      999        27012.95            26901.80
    997      999        27002.96            26928.88
    998      999        26992.97            26955.94
    999      999        26982.98            26982.98
(2) The Nash equilibrium in different cost intervals. The followings demonstrate the procedure of
finding equilibrium point with different cost intervals.
For example, (a) in the case of 0 < q1 < 1,000 and 4,000 < q2 < 5,000,  (q
1
1*, q
5
2*) = (850, 4000)
is the equilibrium point of two best response values.
    q1      q2*        f2(q1, q2*)         f1(q1, q2*)
   ==          ==          ========      ========
   4000      850        -2775.00       -16000.00
   4001      849        -2783.50       -15991.50
    q2    q1*      f1(q1*, q2)       f2(q1*, q2)
    ==       ==         ========       ========
    849     4000       -15960.00        -2775.01
    850     4000       -16000.00        -2775.00
    851     4000       -16040.00        -2775.01
(2) In the case of 1,000 < q1<2,000 and 2,000 <q2<3,000, (q
2
1*, q
3
2*) = (1850, 2000) is the
equilibrium point of two best response values.
     q1     q2*         f2(q1, q2*)       f1(q1, q2*)
     ==       ==           ========     ========
   1849     2000         7020.00        14224.99
   1850     2000         7000.00        14225.00
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   1851     2000         6980.00        14224.99
     q2     q1*      f1(q1*, q2)         f2(q1*, q2)
     ==       ==        ========         ========
   2000     1850        14225.00         7000.00
   2001     1849        14206.50         7018.50
(3) In the case of 1,000 < q1<2,000 and 3,000 < q2<4,000, (q
2
1*, q
4
2*) = (1350, 2000) is the
equilibrium point of two best response values.
   q1    q2*        f2(q1, q2*)        f1(q1, q2*)
   ==        ==           ========      ========
   1349     3000          530.00        -1775.01
   1350     3000          500.00        -1775.00
   1351     3000          470.00        -1775.01
    q2    q1*        f1(q1*, q2)         f2(q1*, q2)
    ==       ==           ========       ========
   3000     1350        -1775.00          500.00
   3001     1349        -1788.50          513.50
